Seen from the West, political debates and developments in China are not always easy to decipher. The present interview must be understood as a broad fresco of the major intellectual currents underlying contemporary debates in China, with a special emphasis on the historical background. The central theme is “anticapitalism” since, surprisingly enough, this remains the axis around which present controversies revolve.

In other contexts, you distinguish, at least, five groups in the description of political debates in contemporary China, namely the Liberalists, the Old Left, the New Left, the NeoMaoists, and the Cultural conservatives. By “Liberalists” you mean a group in favor of the development of capitalist relationships in China and the establishment of the corresponding multiparty class republic, “democracy”; they are also in favor of (neoliberal) globalization and want to learn from the West. The ideological and political stands characteristic of the four remaining groups are much more difficult to analyze

Seen from the West, the reference to Marx is often understood as the formal statement of the commitment of the Chinese Government to the construction of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. Does this view define the “Old Left”?

The terms the Old Left and the New Left in China were created in the 1990s to designate two distinct groups of scholars, both critical of the development of Capitalism in China. The Old Left refers to the group using the traditional theoretical framework of Marxism (the philosophy of materialism, the traditional Marxist political economy, and the theory of scientific socialism) to express their criticism of Capitalism. Yes, the “Old Left” can be characterized by the commitment to the project of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Actually, during the last 30 years, a number of changes occurred in the primary concerns of the Old Left. In the 1980s, when China had just started the process of opening-up and reform, the main preoccupation was the fight against capitalist trends and the preservation of the socialist nature of the country. Involved were the continuation of public ownership and planning in the economy, the preservation of the leadership of the Communist Party in the field of politics, and the prolongation of the dominance of traditional Marxism in the area of ideology. But, during the last decade, facing the rapid development of the Chinese economy, the main concern of a number of the members of the Old Left became the ideological justification of the socialism with Chinese characteristics (or the “Chinese mode of development” as being a socialist mode of development).

Nowadays, some people believe that, by emphasizing the socialist nature of the Chinese mode of development, these Old Leftists are still pushing the government in the direction of the necessary limitation and regulation on the development of capital and market. In this sense, it could be said that the Old Left is one among the anti-capitalist currents. From the viewpoint of ordinary Chinese people, however, the term old clearly indicates that this current is considered outdated. On the one hand, with the introduction and the development of capital and market, the theories of the Old Left (formulated within the old framework) seem to be totally irrelevant to contemporary Chinese life; on the other hand, concerning the ideological justification of the success of Chinese socialism, the theories of the Old Left seem to have no essential relations with the problems actually met.

Among the scholars belonging to other groups, the Old Left is not taken seriously. Many, notably liberal scholars, contend that the Old Leftists are actually helping the government to manage the relationship between its own power and the development of capitalism. They, thus, became the “suppliers” of the government in the ideology of socialism. Thus, the members of the Old Left are depicted by Chinese scholars as “fake leftists and true conservatives”.

And what is the attitude of the Chinese government?

As can be expected, the attitude of the government toward the Old Left is quite positive. The relationship between them is one of reciprocal support. As the Old Left provides the ideology of socialism to the government, the government also supports the Old Left.

During about the last three decades, minor changes occurred within this relationship. In the 1980s, diverging voices were heard within the government, some in support of the policy of reform, and others quite conservative. The Old Left corresponded to these conservative voices. Since the 1990s, the emphasis in the government was more on economic development. Correlatively, the objective of the Old Left became the preservation of continuity and stability in the area of ideology. The main job of this Left was the explanation of the project of socialism with Chinese characteristics. After 2000, with the on-going debates around the Chinese mode of development, members of the Old Left were appointed to even more important positions in the area of ideology.

The Project for the study and construction of Marxism, launched by the central government in 2004, is a typical example of this latter development. This project was a direct response to the on-going crisis of ideology. It is a multi-dimensional project to further develop Marxist ideology in present-day China. It is composed of several sub-projects, namely the position of the discipline of Marxist studies in the educationalsystem, the preparation of a set of Marxist textbooks, the theoretical development of Chinese Marxism, and the like. As a result, as I said, old-left scholars have been appointed to important positions. For example, a major component of this project was the establishment, in 2005, of the College for Marxist Studies within the Chinese Academy for Social Science. The institution became the most important platform for old-left scholars working in the field of Marxist ideology.

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How do students react to being thought along traditional Marxist lines?

The students’ reaction to this is twofold. On the one hand, because of these Marxist classes, students became less and less interested in any kind of Marxism. A number of Marxist scholars, who are not on the ideological track of the Old Left, complain that this teaching in universities did not bring the students closer to Marxism, quite the opposite.  The students do not rebel against this teaching. They take the existence of these classes as a mere fact. Or, one could contend that they are not even interested in refuting these teachings. They consider them as totally irrelevant to their life.

I have been personally involved in the association “World Association for Political Economy” (WAPE). Is it a component of this new policy?

I am not sure about whether the association is a direct component of this new policy or not. Probably, it is only an academic association, but many of its members share the viewpoint of the Old Left. If so, many must be actively involved in the project.

Before moving to the New Left, could you explain what the “New enlightenment movement” was?

To begin with, I want to stress that both new-left scholars and liberal scholars—which always contend they share the viewpoint of classical liberalism rather than neoliberalism—claim they are the true inheritors of the neo-enlightenment movement of the 1980s. Actually, almost all of them were directly involved in this movement. Hence its importance.

The main features of the historical background must be recalled here. The political revolution of 1911, with the institution of the Republic of China in 1912 under the ephemeral presidency of Sun Yatsen, did not really solve the problems of the country. From the year 1915 onward, the “New culture movement”—tightly linked to the May 4th, 1919, upheaval of the students—developed as a powerful response to the difficult conditions then prevailing. This movement is known as the “Chinese project of enlightenment” in the early 20th century, or the “first enlightenment movement in China”. The objective was the construction of the “New Culture”, in which the criticism and abolition of the old traditional culture were implied. Among the intellectuals involved, it was firmly believed that only a genuine “cultural revolution” could allow for the modernization of China and save the country. Science and Democracy were held as the two banners. This is the time when the framework of “the Modern vs. the Traditional” was devised. But, simultaneously, this first enlightenment movement was intertwined with the patriotic movement. May 4th was actually a movement of the students to save the country. Thus, from the very beginning, the project of enlightenment and the determination to save the nation from the hands of the imperialist countries were linked together. This interconnection finally led to the interruption of the project of enlightenment in China.

In the 1980s, with the beginning of China’s reforms and opening up, a new movement developed among scholars and young students. It was named the “Neo-enlightenment movement”, because it was considered the continuation of the above New Culture movement. 

The participants in the neo-enlightenment movement thought that the enlightenment project of the early 20th century had been stopped by China’s acceptance of socialism under the compelling pressure of national survival; in their fight for the survival of the nation, Chinese people had chosen socialism as a way to resist western nations. Consequently, traditional socialism was deemed by the participants of the neo-enlightenment movement a form of pre-modern traditionalism. They believed the serious problems met in the praxis of socialism in China could be attributed to this interruption of the project of enlightenment. Based on this judgment, they started a multi-dimensional criticism of traditional socialism in China, combining the frameworks of the Traditional vs. The modern and China vs. the West. In their criticism of this form of socialism and of the Chinese traditional culture—they passionately argued in favor of human freedom and liberation. They were demanding the freedom of the economy, political freedom and, in the area of philosophy, the respect of human subjectivity. Concerning the future of China, they strongly contended that China needed to follow the trends of world history and modernize.

Because of the neo-enlightenment movement, the 1980s have been considered a golden age for scholars. During this decade, the scholars participating in the project of criticizing all kinds of traditionalism, had the impression they were actually acting in the spirit of independent thinking. They were criticizing the official ideology of the government and the traditional version of Marxism. They also firmly believed that they were carrying out this mission to the benefit of the entire Chinese nation, since they were trying to figure out the right way for the country to go.

Thus, as I said, both the new-left scholars and the liberal scholars claim to be the true inheritors of this neo-enlightenment movement. They try to prove that they have inherited its true spirit, that is, critical thinking.

Could you explain what the philosophers of the new enlightenment movement made of Lukacs and the Frankfurt School?

Within this movement, traditional Marxism, or dogmatic Marxism, was one of the main targets of criticism. It was also during this period that the tradition of western Marxism—from Georg Lukacs to the Fankfurt School, and then the French Marxists and others—were introduced into China. These theories were used as direct resources by Chinese scholars to build what was called “humanist Marxism”, whose main targets were the criticism of alienation and the ultimate aim of human liberation. Since these trends directly corresponded to the main aspect of the neo-enlightenment, namely the demand for human freedom, humanist Marxism was one of the most important components.

More specifically, to build humanist Marxism, Chinese scholars drew from two sources, the western Marxist criticisms of alienation and reification, and Marx’s own criticism of alienation (especially as developed in the 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts). They made of Marx’s criticism of alienation the core of their criticism of capitalism, extending the notion to alienation within socialist societies. Thus, humanist Marxism used Marxism both as a criticism of traditional socialism and as a basis for the establishment of human freedom. So, roughly speaking, it could be said that within the neo-enlightenment movement, western Marxism was transformed into humanist Marxism, and that humanist Marxism was taken as a platform for human liberation.

And the New Left? Was it the continuation of this movement? What are the main themes? What are the relationships between  the New Left and other groups?

New-left scholars claim they are the true inheritors of the neo-enlightenment movement. They mean that they simultaneously kept the critical spirit of the new enlightenment, and transcended its simple theoretical framework. They contend that, since the 1990s, both domestic and international conditions have radically changed. Within China, with the development of market and capital, the problem of social inequality became acute; internationally, with the development of the Chinese economy, the conflicts between the particular interests of different countries—especially between the most developed and the less developed countries—appeared clearly to the Chinese people. Combining these two aspects, one can contend that, nowadays, modernization is not simply an ideal for the Chinese people to pursue, but a challenging problem for China.

In this new context, the New Left emphasizes that the basic ways of thinking of the Chinese people must be transformed. The crucial issue is not the criticism of the pre-modern tradition, but the reflection on modernity itself. China needs to confront the real problems posed by the present process of Chinese modernization, that is, the problems inherent in the relationship between capital and the nation state, and the relationship between freedom and equality. Both are not only difficult theoretical issues, but also real problems within the contemporary Chinese mode of development.

The concrete issues are the dependent position of the Chinese economy within global capitalism, and the serious problems in the fields of social justice, people’s basic living conditions in China, and the like. The problem of social justice is obvious, given the growing gap between rich and poor people. New Leftists contend the direct reason for this situation is the unbridled development of capitalism in China. They emphasize the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the situation in the countryside. They argue that in both fields, the government proved totally impotent in the conduct of its relationship with capital. Based on this criticism of present-day Chinese reality, New Leftists also made great efforts to figure out a possible alternative path for China. This is the axis around which their theories aiming at the definition of an alternative type of democracy revolve.

With respect to the relationship between the New Left and other groups, at least two aspects must be mentioned. One is the controversy betwe《en them and Chinese Liberalists; the other is the difference between New Leftists and Chinese Marxist scholars.

So you mentioned the controversy between the New Leftists and the liberalists.

First, a few precisions concerning the liberalists. Since the late 1990s, liberal scholars have been very active within the academic and cultural spheres. Most of them, I recall, claim they are “liberal”, not “neoliberal”, continuing the tradition of classical liberalism. They are, therefore, more concerned with the problem of social justice and the living conditions of the less privileged people in the society than neoliberals. Observing the serious problems in the era of social justice, they are particularly worried about finding a possible way out in the direction of democratic politics.

Since the 1990s, this controversy between the New Left and the liberalists was the most important phenomenon among Chinese intellectuals. It revolves around three main issues. First, what is now the ultimate problem within China, the problem of equality or privileges? The former is about the relationship between freedom and equality; the latter, mainly about the relationship between freedom and privileges. Second, what should be the way for China to solve these problems. An alternative type of democracy? Direct democracy as opposed to the socialist system led by the Communist Party? Or constitutional democracy? Third, who are the true inheritors of the neo-enlightenment movement, critical intellectuals, that is, the New Leftists, or the liberalists?

As for the first issue—the relationship between freedom and equality—the New Leftists argue that, given the great changes brought about by the process of opening up and reform, the core issue has now shifted to this relationship. We must now leave the framework of the neo-enlightenment movement to solve the crisis of modernity itself. We can not continue to fight only for freedom—susceptible of being interpreted as the freedom of private property granted by constitutional democracy—because this form of freedom will never lead the country out of the present crisis. The crisis is one of inequality, both at domestic and international levels. So, to solve present problems in China, an alternative way out must be found, tackling simultaneously the issues of freedom and equality, namely an “alternative type of democracy”. The New Leftists emphasize three aspects of this democracy: economic, at the elementary level (self-governance in local units such as villages), and direct democracy.

Concerning the second question—the relationship between freedom and privileges— Chinese liberalists still consider it the crucial problem in present-day China. In other words, the fights against all kinds of privileges, the outcome of the non-democratic political system in China, and for the freedom of everybody are the tasks we must confront.  Chinese liberalists contend that the solution lies in the implementation of constitutional democracy, in which they see the appropriate system leading to the implementation of the principles of freedom in China.

The debate can be summarized as follows. To the views of the Liberalists, the New Leftists oppose the statement that the process of opening up and reform has brought about great changes in the Chinese society. In this context, the exclusive liberal emphasis on freedom can be interpreted as the promotion of trends leading to the privatization of state-owned enterprises. The final effect of the so-called “constitutional democracy” would only be the guarantee given by the constitution to private property rights. In this sense, freedom in the liberalist sense of the term would only bring privileges for a minority, rather than the abolishment of privileges in the Chinese society as Liberalists contend. In response, Chinese liberalists oppose that the new-leftist discourse on equality is only a form of abstract utopia, since they intentionally leave aside the problem of political equality and, simultaneously, fully ignore the inner connection between the progress of human freedom and the progress of social equality. In other words, liberalists contend that we cannot solve simultaneously the problems of freedom and equality, but only make gradual progress. The realist way, in their opinion, is to try to progress concerning human freedom first, what would then help to solve the problem of social inequality. In addition, they also point out that, due to the absence of effectiveness of both democracy at basic levels and economic democracy, the New Leftists actually pave the way to “populist authoritarianism”.Liberal scholars, analyzing the Chinese experience during the last six decades, thus, contend that the New Leftists actually advocate a form of “statism”; New-leftists use the reference to direct democracy as an instrument in the justification of government action. In other words, still following the liberalists, the New Leftists move from “alternative democracy” to the “responsive democracy” of the socialist government led by the Communist party. In this responsive democracy, the subject of democracy is not the people, but the rulers; the so-called “direct democracy” and the democracy at the elemental level are only instruments aiming at the justification of the government; politics are, thus, reduced to the question of “good governance”; and, finally, democracy is transformed into democracy from the top, that is, about the ways by which the rulers could respond to the needs of ordinary people.

As I already mentioned, both of the New Leftists and the Liberalists claim they are the true inheritors of the neo-enlightenment movement. To make this link more conspicuous, the New Leftists call themselves “the critical scholars” rather than “the New Left”, thus claiming the their direct relationship to the neo-enlightenment movement. The Liberalists carefully differentiate themselves from the neoliberals; they claim they are the continuators of the tradition of classical liberalism, that is, are actually concerned with the problems of social justice and the benefit of the less privileged people.

Can we clearly characterize the new-left current as being anticapitalist? As being Marxists?

The analysis of these controversies between the New Leftists and the Liberalists clearly shows that the New Leftists are deeply worried about the unbridled development of capitalism in China. They firmly believe that this development will finally draw China into its ultimate crisis. Reflecting on the existing possibilities to limit and regulate the unbridled development of capital in China, they resolutely reject the system of constitutional democracy, in which they see a mere instrument to justify and guarantee the establishment of capitalism. The analysis of their discussions concerning alternative forms of democracy, reveal that they seek a way to revive the socialist legacy within present-day China. But many problems remain to be solved. The most important is how to avoid populist authoritarianism. Again, the crucial  issue appears to be the relationship between capital and the state.

Though the New Left is the most important force critical of capitalism in China, its member never present themselves as Marxists. Reflecting on the Marxist discourse in the 1980s, Wang Hui

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, one of the most prominent scholars in the New Left, pointed out that three kinds of Marxism can be distinguished within China: traditional Marxism (the Marxism of the Old Left), the Marxism of the reforms, and humanist Marxism. The main difference is between the first and the third category.  While traditional Marxism insisted on the traditional socialist way to realize the objective of modernization, the latter two categories emphasized the necessity of finding new paths to the same end. While the Marxism of the reforms emphasized that the essence of socialism is the liberation of productivity, the humanist Marxism argued in favor of the ultimate importance of human freedom in China. So, both of them were latter the prominent voices within the neo-enlightenment movement.

The New Leftists, as the scholars of the 1990s, believe they broke with these three categories of Marxism. Concerning their theoretical inspiration, they are more interested in the contemporary western left-wing thinking. In their criticism of the unbridled development of capitalism in China, they have, however, integrated the western Marxist analyses of late capitalism, of globalization (like dependence theory, world-system theory), and other relevant theories. Conversely, they do not care much about the recent work of Chinese Marxist scholars. To some extent, they seem to believe that present-day Marxist studies in China are still locked within the old framework. For this reason, in lieu of official Marxists in the area of ideology or Marxist specialists in universities, they believe they are the true critical scholars.

To many people in the West, the revival of Maoism sounds particularly weird? Could you speak a bit the origins of this current?

Two main threads are involved. One is the ordinary people spontaneous reaction to the problems brought about by the development of markets and capital in China since the 1980s. The other element is the support given to the movement by some among the Old Leftists. The convergence between these two trends led to the emergence of neoMaoism. In 2003, the neoMaoist began their website, “Utopia”, which became one of their most important platforms.

Consider the second component—from within the Old Left. When China had just started the process of opening up and reform in the 1980s, the main concern of the Old Left was to fight against capitalist trends and preserve the socialist nature of the country. This current echoed one among the various conflicting voices heard within the government. Some among the Old Leftists began to work for the existing government, constructing the ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics, while others became very critical. This latter group argued that the reform process had resulted in severe problems in China, notably the huge gap between rich and poor people, the serious problem of corruption, and the selling of national interests to private national and international capitals. So, they believed, the time had come to analyze and correct the entire set of policies concerning reform.

The movement is called “neo-Maoism”, because it clearly takes Maoist socialism as still the best way for China. Considering the history of China within the last 60 years, they contend that the prevailing conditions in the areas of social justice, social equality, and people’s way of life in the Maoist period were actually much better than that in present-day China. As for the future of China, they believe that only Maoist socialism could solve present difficulties. Internationally, China still need to fight against imperialism, and, domestically, must strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat to solve the problems of social inequality and corruption.

Is NeoMaoism about going radically out of capitalism, or a problem of “spirit” and “culture”?

Neo-Maoism claims it is the continuation of Maoist socialism. Thus, the transcendence of capitalism is necessarily at issue.  When neoMaoism was put into practice, as in Chongqing

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during the last several years, it appeared, however, to be the combination of a form of petty-bourgeois socialism in the area of economy, and authoritarian government in the area of politics, two notions to which I will return.

The former leader in Chongqing, Bo Xilai, comes from the family of a member of the first generation of Chinese Communist Party leaders. He first claimed that what he was doing in Chongqing was nothing else but the continuation of Maoist Socialism but, later, gave a special definition of Maoist Socialism as “becoming rich together”. At the same time, he emphasized that socialism could only result from the struggle of the people against capitalism, that the policies of the government, which resulted in the serious problem of social inequality, were actually of a capitalist nature, and that the Chongqing experiment is not only of local import, but of universal meaning for the whole of China.

How to really solve the problem of social inequality? Concerning the economy, Bo Xilai took seriously some of the suggestions put forward by a number of new-left scholars, given that these New Leftists are also fighting for social equality. One of these suggestions, put in practice in Chongqing, is a form of petty-bourgeois socialist economy (or “neoPrudhomian socialism

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”). A first aspect concerns peasants and a second, state-owned capital. Given the collective ownership of land, Chongqing neoMaoists emphasize that we need to take measures guaranteeing that peasants (all of them, not just those living within near suburbs) share the benefits resulting from the process of urbanization. As for state-owned enterprises, they emphasize that a high percentage of their benefits must be given back to society. In this way, the problem of social inequality could be partly solved.

Tightly related to this program is the authoritarian government in Chongqing. What is special about it is the self-declaration of democracy. Involved is not, however, democracy from the bottom but democracy from the top. To prove that the government is really the representative of the people, the Chongqing government took a series of measures to strengthen the link between the leaders and rank-and-file people. Two aspects of this relationship, namely the role of officials at different levels and the action of college students, were specifically emphasized. Various measures were taken intending to motivate the officials and the college students to go “to the people”. To really motivate the ordinary people, the local government also invested a lot of money in the construction of “the red culture’. In a way, one can contend that they repeated the Maoist policy of motivation of the masses.

This social structure is problematic. Democracy is used not to limit power, but as an instrument providing the existing power with absolute authority. Recently, the Chinese central government changed the leader of Chongqing, revealing the extension of the problems brought about by this unlimited exercise of power.

So, we have two groups of intellectuals critical of the development of capitalism in China, the Old Left and the leaders-intellectuals of Chongqing?

Yes. The combination of the new-left perspective and the Chongqing model has created a new situation. Prior to the Chongqing model, there was a clear separation between the New Leftists in the intellectual sphere, and neo-Maoist revolts at the grass-root level. With the political power coming in, some among the new-left scholars have been integrated into the project in Chongqing. Others still prefer to remain “the intellectuals”, though their attitude toward the local political power is also quite positive. On the website Utopia, you find three kinds of texts: directly related to the Chongqing Model, authored by New Left scholars, and Maoist articles that are passionate but without theoretical foundations.

Could you comment a bit more on neoPrudhomian socialism?

As I mentioned above, neoPrudhomian socialism was originally put forward by new-left scholars as the most feasible way to solve the problem of the growing social inequality. The idea is that Marx’s suggestion of the abolishment of private property is not adapted to Chinese realities. Four main points are stressed. First, concerning land ownership, the system of collective ownership is kept as the best way to actualize the principle of equality. Second, concerning the relationship between labor and capital, we need to establish a “labor-capital partnership”, that is, the workers should also become the shareholders of enterprises. Third, concerning the relationship between the state-owned capital and society, the government needs to pay the benefits from these enterprises back to society. Fourth, concerning the organization of production, we should establish the system of economic democracy. These suggestions have been partly put into practice in Chongqing as new economic policies intending to diminish the radical gap between rich and poor people.

Can we move to the “Cultural conservatives”? Is this movement linked to “Confucianism” or “neo-authoritarism”? Is it a component of the anticapitalist movement?

Two related aspects must be distinguished in the analysis of the historical background of cultural conservatism in contemporary China. The first factor was the rise of nationalism since the 1990s, and the second, New-Confucianism[5], whose roots can be found in the first enlightenment movement in the early 20th century.

All scholars involved in the first enlightenment movement were fighting for the survival of the Chinese nation. Some claimed that China needed to get totally rid of its traditional culture; to the contrary, New-Confucianism emerged in those years as a straightforward response to the currents of “westernization”. This criticism of westernization involved both a concern for the survival of the Chinese nation and a desire to confront a universal problem, namely the crisis of modernization. The new-Confucians emphasized that the western modern civilization itself posed serious problems. The most important problem, according to them, was the ultimate meaning of human life. The western science, technology, and democracy could never solve this problem. So, the only way to save China was to go back to the Chinese Confucian tradition. From this tradition new economic, social, and political patterns could be derived. They, however, never really accomplished this project. Even though they tried very hard to build the mediating moments between the Confucian ways of moral cultivation and new-Confucian social orders, their theories proved very weak in these respects.

In the 1980s, as many were actively involved in the neo-enlightenment movement, universalism, as opposed to nationalism, was the dominant value shared by both scholars and ordinary people. But, from the early 1990s onward, when the problems brought about by the new economic and political trends of the period became manifest both nationally and internationally, the neo-enlightenment movement started to decline. In this context, people began to question the universalist values of the neo-enlightenment movement, criticizing the belief in universalism. Since then, nationalism became one of the main voices heard in China. Some of the new forms of nationalism were mild; others, more radical. The conservative current of neo-authoritarianism in the 1990s was one expression of this new nationalism. It is also called “neo-conservativism”, “neo-orderism” or “conservative nationalism”. Using Confucianism as their direct theoretical inspiration, the members of this current contend that the most important issue for China is the preservation of a stable social order. This implies the rejection of the western idea of freedom, as well as, to a certain extent, the abandonment of the principle of equality. They emphasize that this is the only way to save both the nation and Chinese socialism.

The sequence of events is important. Most of present-day cultural conservatives had been more or less involved in the neo-enlightenment movement. Having been disappointed with it, they became, as I said, critical of its standpoint of universalism. They abandoned the framework of “the Modern vs. the Traditional”, becoming serious about the Chinese tradition, especially traditional Confucianism. They believe they are now confronting problems similar to those met by the New-Confucians during the first enlightenment; in their view, what they are presently doing must be understood as the accomplishment of the mission the New-Confucians had not successfully achieved in the early 20th century; they claim they are both continuing and transcending the project of the new-Confucianism; the most challenging question for them remains to find these concrete mediating moments to establish the new-Confucian social orders in this modern society, to which I referred above as the weak point of the new-Confucian movement.

Two of their suggestions were widely discussed in China, namely the establishment of Confucianism as the civil religion of China and the experimentation Confucian constitutional politics. The former is considered a relatively mild suggestion. It emphasizes that, facing the decline of morality brought about by the rapid development of capital and market, great efforts should be made to revive the traditional Confucian values as dominant values; the most effective way to obtain this result would be to establish Confucianism as civil religion. The latter is considered as a more “fundamentalist” recommendation. The contention is that neither the Chinese government nor the western democratic form of government is really appropriate. Instead, the only adequate politics in China are Confucian constitutional politics, actually the politics of the so-called “Confucian elites”.

The cultural conservatives also contribute to the rise of anti-capitalist trends in China, mainly because of their opposition to universalism. They definitely reject the idea that the capitalist mode of development—including free-market economics, democratic politics, and the culture of individualism—is the universal pattern appropriate for all countries. This judgment explains their inclination toward anti-globalization and anti-capitalism in China.

How is the situation presently evolving?

The picture I gave of anticapitalist movements in China suggests, I believe, that the main issue is whether there could be an alternative way for China, distinct from the capitalist mode of development, a way that could solve the problems met. While the Chinese liberalists negate the possibility of any alternative, all other currents—the Old Left, the New Left, the neoMaoists, and the cultural conservatives—argue in favor of an alternative path. But what are the resources available to build such an alternative? Some straightforwardly go back to the past in the search of answers. The members of the Old Left return to (traditional) Stalinist Marxism; the neoMaoists, to the historical experience of Maoist socialism; the cultural conservatives, to the tradition of Chinese Confucianism. Only the New Left really attempts to open new paths. They borrowed a lot from the contemporary left-wing thinking to develop their criticism of capitalism. Clearly, they are not content with any kind of simple answer. Their theories—mainly the criticism of capitalism in China—have a significant impact both within China and western countries. But when they are pushed to the point of actually formulating answers, what they can provide remains very weak, namely direct democracy (or democracy at the elemental level, or economic democracy). As the proof is gradually made that such suggestions remain abstract theoretical ideas in China, they, again, place all their hopes in the action of the government. These observations show that anti-capitalist trends in China have not led to really new alternatives. China being already part of the global Capitalist system, it is hard to tell what could be done. The country is now blocked in this situation.

Nonetheless, the existence of these anticapitalist forces also helped China not to become totally capitalized. Capital has not yet devoured all the traditional and socialist legacies. There are still components of the life of the Chinese people that remain traditional or socialist. This could be the reason why the Chinese people can still accept the official ideological language of socialism with Chinese characteristics, though without taking it seriously.

To finish with, at the light of what you said, what is the meaning of the reference to “socialism” in contemporary China?

The term “socialism” has very complicated meanings in China now. Roughly speaking, two kinds of interpretations can be given, namely the official and critical interpretations.

The official interpretation is the so-called “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. It is the combination of two aspects, the traditional and reformed conceptions of socialism. The traditional conception of socialism mainly means public ownership, planned economy, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The reformed conception emphasizes that the essence of socialism is the liberation of productivity. As the combination of these two viewpoints, socialism with Chinese characteristics emphasizes the intervention of the government; the property system is dominated by the public ownership of the means of production; the distribution system is dominated by income distribution according to labor; the market system is dominated by the regulation of the government; and economic development depends on domestic need, capital and technological achievements.

The critical interpretation is mainly put forward by new-left scholars. The emphasis is on the principle of equality. As I mentioned earlier, an alternative type of democracy—direct democracy, economic democracy, or the democracy at the elemental level—is involved. But in reality it can only be actualized under the form of the responsive democracy of the government, that is, the socialist government that claims to really represent the interests of the people. In this way, it could be contended that the critical version of socialism also boils down to government intervention.

[1] The College for Marxist Studies is a sub-institution within the Chinese Academy for Social Science, a component of the project. The Chinese Academy for Social Science was founded more than 60 years ago.

[2] Among Wang Hui’s many publications, one can mention The End of the Revolution. China and the Limits of Modernity, London, New York, 2009.

[3] Chongqing, in the South West of China, is one of the four cities in China which is directly under the control of the central government. In the last few years, under the leadership of Bo Xilai, it became the laboratory of Maoist socialism.

[4] The idea of neo-Prudhomian socialism was originally put forward by one of the neo-leftist scholars as the way for China to go (originally by Cui Zhiyuan). It emphasizes that Marxist socialism (the abolishment of private property) is not adapted to Chinese realities. On the contrary, China should follow the ways of neo-Prudhomian socialism, a kind of petty-bourgeois socialism.

[5] The term “neoConfucianism” refers to the Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties. The term “New-Confucianism” refers to the current that developed in the early 20th century.

（今日马克思》第52期，以英文同时发表于Actuel Marx 的英文网站上，2012年9月）